Die International Crisis Group hat einen neuen Report zum Tschad veröffentlicht. Die Verschlechterung der Lage und das Verhalten Débys werden dort ungeschönt beschrieben, allerdings wird auf die Rolle des EUFOR-Einsatzes nicht eingegangen:
Nevertheless, eastern Chad was relatively stable until 2003, despite a tense political climate and sporadic bloody clashes. The humanitarian and security problems that have shaken it since then are unprecedented, with spillover from the Darfur crisis aggravating pre-existing inter-ethnic confrontations and strengthening cross-border intercommunal loyalties.
Large-scale internal displacement and a massive influx of Sudanese refugees have upset eastern Chad’s demographic balance and intensified the struggle for resources. Both the Chadian government and rebel groups have armed their supporters, leading to bloodier banditry and bloodier inter-ethnic conflicts that often pit farmers against cattle breeders and making the work of humanitarian workers increasingly difficult. The central government has systematically co-opted for its own political purposes traditional mediation and conflict management mechanisms, such as diyah, the compensation due for shedding blood.
For more than five years, the Déby regime has instrumentalised the troubles in eastern Chad in order to perpetuate itself. Déby has been able not only to divide his political opponents at the local level in the East, but also to limit the political space for his adversaries at the national level. His strategy has had two phases. During the first, in 2004-2005, the government tried and failed to consolidate the support of its Zaghawa ethnic base. Following splits among the Zaghawa, Déby stoked the historical mistrust between the Zaghawa and Tama ethnic groups in Dar Tama. He claimed that the Front uni pour le changement (FUC), the main coalition of rebel groups at the time, was an alliance between the Tama and the Janjawid of Darfur ill-repute and had been armed by Khartoum to eliminate the Zaghawa on both sides of the border. To the international community, he depicted the FUC as the “Chadian-armed right hand of the Sudanese Islamist regime”, a characterisation that was widely accepted, given the many Janjawid attacks against Sudanese refugees in Chad.
During the second phase, from 2006 to the present, the government has tried with limited success to win the allegiance of the Dadjo ethnic group in Dar Sila by providing support both for existing Dadjo self-defence groups and for the creation of new, mostly Dadjo militias. This support is supposed to protect civilians from Janjawid attacks, but its real purpose is to enlist the Dadjo in fighting Chadian rebel groups. In turn, rebel leaders have used the crisis as a convenient political justification for settling scores with Déby. Sudan has exacerbated the instability in the East by supporting virtually all the rebel groups, even though they are strongly divided along ethnic lines.
Dann wird doch kurz die EUFOR erwähnt, sie hätte die Lage jedenfalls nicht “signifikant” verbessert:
The international community has had a pair of peacekeeping missions on the scene since February 2008 to alleviate spillover effects of the Sudanese conflict into eastern Chad: a European Union force (EUFOR) and the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT). However, neither significantly improved the security situation.
Entsprechend taucht die EU unter den Empfehlungen nur noch in aller Kürze auf:
To the European Union: Finance and help organise the peace conference on eastern Chad.
Das ist in seiner Kürze bemerkenswert und deutet darauf hin, dass selbst die ICG keine Perspektive mehr für ein militärisches Engagement sieht. Erstaunlich ist allerdings, dass gerade von Frenkreich hingegen erwartet wird, dass es seinen Einfluss auf Déby nutze und den Druck erhöhe, Friedensverhandlungen aufzunehmen:
France, which has reinforced Déby without helping the Chadians to find a durable solution to the crisis, should pressure the government to engage with the communities in the East for the organisation of such a conference…
To the Government of France: Support diplomatically and financially the organisation of the peace conference on eastern Chad and make its financial, military and political support to the government conditional on progress in that conference and other national conflict resolution mechanisms.