Archiv für die Kategorie ‘Haiti’

Haiti als Testfall für Zivil-Militärische Zusammenarbeit bei der NATO

Donnerstag, 18. Februar 2010

Dass sich die Katastrophe in Haiti als Testfall nicht nur für die EUropäische Außenpolitik, die European Gendarmerie Force und das zivil-militärische Krisenmanagement insgesamt “anbietet”, ist ja klar. Dass und in welchem Maße hieran nun auch die NATO beteiligt ist, dafür einige Beispiele. Hier zunächst einige Links, die davon berichten, dass sowohl von der erst vor drei Jahren in Ungarn stationierten Strategic Airlift Capability (SAC) als auch vom NATO-Stützpunkt in Gailenkirchen Hilfslieferungen von der NATO im Auftrag ziviler Behörden nach Haiti geflogen wurden:

C17 conducts third humanitarian relief flight to Haiti
NATO Aircraft transports humanitarian aid for Haiti

Besonders spannend finde ich aber den Bericht über das offensichtlich noch im Experimentierstadium befindliche Civil-Military Fusion Centre (CFC) am für die Transformation zuständigen Hauptquartier der NATO (Allied Command Transformation, ACT) in Norfolk, Virginia. Diese betreiben eine Webseite mit dem Titel Civil-Military Overview (CMO).

Insgesamt bietet dieses “Portal” auf den ersten Blick wenig Informationen oder zumindest Zugang zu diesen. Schnell wird aber klar, dass die Haiti-Sonderseite auch der Profilierung dienen soll. So werden hier zahlreiche, wenn auch wenig brauchbare Karten, Übersichten, Berichte und Pressemitteilungen über Hilfslieferungen gesammelt und thematisch geordnet(”Cluster”) zugänglich gemacht. Es liefert einen guten Überblick über die militärischen Koordinierungsbemühungen der Katastrophenhilfe von Morgen - und den Einblick, dass es letztlich doch die zivilen Helfer und hilfsorganisationen sind, die wirklich helfen.

Wer auf täglicher Ebene möglichst genau nachverfolgen will, wie die Situation in Haiti aussieht und was die internationale Gemeinschaft tut, mag die Seite mit den Situation Reports hilfreich finden. Dort sind nicht nur die täglichen Berichte des OCHA, USAIDS und des britischen Department for International Development dokumentiert, sondern auch diejenigen der US-Amerikanischen Joint Task Force (JTF) Haiti, die sich (auch bei Youtube, Twitter und Flickr) alle Mühe gibt, ihre gute Zusammenarbeit mit der Haitianischen Regierung, den UN usw. zu betonen.

Hier finden sich beispielsweise die Bilder eines MINUSTAH-Aufklärungsfluges, mit dem der Zustand der Häfen in Haiti festgestellt werden sollte.

EU / HAITI: Wie aus Nichts 400 Mio. Euro werden

Montag, 18. Januar 2010

Die Medien überschlagen sich: zuerst stellt die EU laut spiegel-online 400 Mio. für die Erdbebenopfer zur Verfügung, dann berichtet die Tagesschau von 420 Mio. das St. Gallener Tagblatt führt bislang mit 429 Mio.

Das erstaunt! Lautet doch der Passus zu den finanziellen Zusagen der EU im offiziellen Abschlussdokument der außerordentlichen Ratstagung folgendermassen:

The Council also welcomes the European Commission’s preliminary commitment of a total of 30 million EUR in humanitarian assistance, and by Member States who have preliminarily committed a further 92 million EUR. Following the launch of the UN’s Flash Appeal for 575 million USD, the EU signalled its willingness to provide further humanitarian assistance in response to emerging needs. The Council also welcomes that for early non-humanitarian assistance, focusing notably on restoration of government capabilities, the preliminary financial contribution from the EU instruments amounts to 100 million EUR. The Council welcomes the proposal of the Commission to dispatch a joint team of EU experts to assess the most pressing needs, notably to support the capacity of the Haitian authorities. With regard to possible contributions from the Member States, the Council will revert to the issue at its next meeting on 25 January 2010.

Zusammengefasst: Die EU-Kommission gibt 30 Mio. für humanitäre Hilfe. Weitere 100 Mio. sollen über “Instrumente” der EU bereitgestellt werden - aber nicht für humanitäre Hilfe. Es kann sich dabei eigentlich nur über das sogenannte Stabilitätsinstrument handeln, mit dem bei Krisen die staatlichen Institutionen - allen voran die Polizei - unterstütz werden sollen. Die Mitgliedsstaaten haben insgesamt 92 Mio. Euro zur Verfügung gestellt. Das ist nun eher lächerlich für 27 Staaten, von denen viele zu den reichsten der Welt gehören. Die Forderungen des UN-Flash Appeal hingegen wurden auf die lange Bank geschoben, immerhin wurde “Bereitschaft” signalisiert.

Wie werden daraus nun 400 bis 429 Mio. Euro, von denen laut Brüssel-Korrespondentin Marion von Haaren “der Lowenanteil … jetzt zunächst mal in alles das fließt, was jetzt gebraucht wird, Lazarette, Trinkwasseraufbereitungsanlagen, Zelte, Ernährung, Versorgung…”?

Eine Aufschlüsselung bietet tagesschau.de an. Demnach seien

“30 Millionen Euro für die humanitäre Soforthilfe sowie 107 Millionen Euro Millionen als rasche Wiederaufbauhilfe [bereitgestellt]. Mindestens 200 Millionen Euro seien für den mittel- und langfristigen Bedarf vorgesehen, sagte Entwicklungshilfekommissar Karel de Gucht nach einem Sondertreffen der Außen- und Entwicklungsminister in Brüssel. Zusätzlich stellen die EU-Mitgliedsstaaten nach Angaben eines Kommissionssprechers 92 Millionen Euro zur Verfügung.”

Das ergibt insgesamt 429 Mio. Euro (damit wissen wir, wo das St. Gallener Tagblatt abgeschrieben hat). Wobei allerdings 92 Mio. Euro eigentlich von den einzelnen Mitgliedsstaaten kommen. Trotzdem ein ansehnlicher Betrag. Warum gab sich die EU nun aber in ihrer offiziellen Stellungnahme so bescheiden?
Die Lösung ist in der offiziellen Ankündigung der außerordentlichen Ratssitzung zu finden. Darin hieß es:

The 10th European Development Fund assigns to Haiti a core budget of EUR 291m for the period from 2008 to 2013, primarily for infrastructure projects and governance support. An additional EUR 13.6m is earmarked for unforeseen events in Haiti. In 2009, further funds were allocated to Haiti to help it face the global economic crisis through the so-called “Vulnerability Flex” mechanism. These amount to EUR 30m.

Die 200+ Mio. entstammen somit dem Betrag, der im wohlbekannten European Development Fund (EDF) ohnehin für Haiti vorgesehen waren. Wohlgemerkt: Beim EDF handelt sich gar nicht (ausschließlich) um Entwicklungshilfegelder, die den OECD-Kriterien entsprechen würden, sondern vielfach werden hierüber - ähnlich dem Stabilitätsinstrument - Polizei- und Gendarmeriekräfte sowie Armeen ausgerüstet und ausgebildet, insbesondere Einsätze der African Standby Force werden hierüber von der EU finanziert. Bereits im Haushalt vorgesehen waren demnach 13.6 Mio. Euro für “unvorhersehbare Ereignisse”, ergänzt um ein weiteres Instrument zum Ausgleich für die Auswirkungen der Finanzkrise ergeben sich hieraus insgesamt 30 Mio. Euro. und damit der Betrag, den die EU nun tatsächlich, antizipiert unvorhersehbar bereitstellt. Alles andere ist Lug und Trug und v.a. nicht für humanitäre Hilfe vorgesehen, sondern für die “Stärkung staatlicher Strukturen” (”langfristige Wiederaufbauhilfe”), also v.a. für Sicherheitskräfte.

Vor dem Hintergrund dieser enormen Summe, die Entwicklungshilfekommissar de Gucht da aus dem Hut zauberte, erscheint das wesentliche, wenn auch informelle Ergebnis des Treffens eher eine Randnotiz, etwa bei spiegel-online:

“Die Union will außerdem 140 bis 150 Beamte der “Europäischen Gendarmerietruppe” (EGF) nach Haiti entsenden.”

Dabei wird es sich um Angehörige der französischen Gendarmerie Nationale handeln, die in mehr als zwanzig Staaten - überwiegend ehemaligen Kolonien - aktiv ist und dort v.a. Polizeiausbildung betreibt, den Schutz der Botschaften übernimmt und in Krisensituationen französische Staatsbürger evakuiert. Eine größere Rolle hat sie v.a. in den 1990ern in Algerien gespielt. Die EGF geht auf eine französische Initiative zurück und bedeutet nichts weiter als eine europäische Kooperation von Gendarmerie-Einheiten, die bereits in Bosnien das Kommando übernommen haben und zukünftig führend bei der EUPOL-Mission in Afghanistan sein sollen. “Entsenden” kann die “Union” die EGF gar nicht, da diese weder eine Institution der EU ist, noch das zugrunde liegende Abkommen völkerrechtlich ratifiziert ist. Aber sie kann natürlich dabei mitspielen, dem französischen Einsatz von Polizeisoldaten ein europäisches Mantelchen überzustülpen um trotz der marginalen Hilfe ihre Bedeutung bei der global governance zu unterstreichen. Frankreich wird’s recht sein, der EU auch. Wie damals im Tschad. Das nicht gerade gute, aber bislang faktenreichste Dokument zur EGF findet sich hier.

A Comparative Atlas of Defence in Latin America 2008

Mittwoch, 23. September 2009

Das Center for Civil-Military Relations (Monterey/USA) bietet eine umfassende Darstellung über Strukturen, Budgets, Sicherheits- und Militärdefinitionen, politische Entscheidungsgremien sowie weitere Daten das Militär betreffend über sämtliche Länder Latein Amerikas an - plus einen Sonderteil über Haiti in ihrer Publikation “A Comparative Atlas of Defence in Latin America 2008″.

Introduction
Chapter 1: The Legal Framework
Chapter 2: The Budgets
Chapter 3: Political Definitions
Chapter 4: Congressional Powers
Chapter 5: System Organization
Chapter 6: The Ministries of Defence
Chapter 7: Defence Education
Chapter 8: The Armed Forces
Chapter 9: Argentina
Chapter 10: Bolivia
Chapter 11: Brazil
Chapter 12: Chile
Chapter 13: Colombia
Chapter 14: Dominican Republic
Chapter 15: Ecuador
Chapter 16: El Salvador
Chapter 17: Guatemala
Chapter 18: Honduras
Chapter 19: Mexico
Chapter 20: Nicaragua
Chapter 21: Paraguay
Chapter 22: Peru
Chapter 23: Uruguay
Chapter 24: Venezuela
Chapter 25: Special Report: Peace Operations and Cooperation in Latin America

Mandatsverlängerung MINUSTAH, Berichte über die Slum-Offensive von 2006 in Haiti

Mittwoch, 23. September 2009

Gegenwärtig wird in der UN die Verlängerung des MINUSTAH-Mandates, das im Oktober ausläuft, diskutiert. Neben dem UN-Generalsekretär tun sich insbesondere der neue UN-Sondergesandte Bill Clinton und der französische Außenminister Kouchner als Befürworter der Mandatsverlängerung hervor. Im Vorfeld dieser Debatte werden absurde Berichte über eine Verbesserung der Lage und realistische Chancen für eine dauerhafte Stabilisierung lanciert (z.B. hier von der UN). Neben der Forderung nach einer Verlängerung und “Neukonfiguration” des Mandates wird wie immer auch um mehr finanzielle Hilfe geworben. Die Sicherheit hätte sich verbessert, die soziale und ökonomische Lage hingegen kaum.

Tatsächlich hat Haiti wieder blutige Sommermonate erlebt, bei denen mehrfach UN-Soldaten gegen Demonstranten vorgegangen sind. Im April wurden mindestens 5 Personen bei Protesten gegen hohe Preise und niedrige Löhne erschossen. Ende Mai begannen Studentenproteste gegen den schlechten Zustand der Universität und die Streichung von Kursen, die ebenfalls eskalierten. Ebenfalls Ende Mai starb Gerard Jean-Juste, eine Identifikationsfigur der Lavalas-Bewegung, der 2006 durch Inhaftierung von einer Kandidatur bei den Wahlen ausgeschlossen wurde. Bei seiner Beerdigung wurde einer der Trauernden erschossen. Die UN leugneten “kategorisch”, dass UN-Kräfte hieran schuld seien, obwohl zahlreiche Augenzeugen dies behaupten, es offensichtlich zumindest Warnschüsse gegeben habe und ein Obduktionsbericht dies nahelegt (die UN hatten vor dem durchsickern dieses Berichts behauptet, der Tote sei durch einen Stein oder einen stumpfen Gegenstand verletzt worden). Auch im Vorfeld der Senatswahlen kam es zu Zusammenstößen, an denen die UN aber nur periphär beteiligt waren.

Vor dem Hintergrund dieser Ereignisse und der regelmäßigen Menschenrechtsverletzungen durch die MINUSTAH forderte die International Association of Democratic Lawyers, dass das Mandat der MINUSTAH nicht verlängert und alle Opfer der MINUSTAH entschädigt werden sollten. Eine gute und recht ausgewogene Zusammenfassung dieser Ereignisse findet sich hier.

Die Offensive von 2006

Zum Hintergrund der angeblich verbesserten Sicherheitslage sei hier auf einige Dokumente des United States Institute for Peace hingewiesen, das eine eigene, ganz widerliche Haiti Working Group unterhält.

Dieser Bericht des United States Institute for Peace (USIP) über die Versuche von UN und HNP von 2006, die Slums von Cité Soleil wieder unter Kontrolle zu bekommen, ist zwar bereits recht alt, aber eindrucksvoll. deshalb möchte ich ihn hier ausführlich dokumentieren, auch damit er erhalten bleibt, falls das PDF eines Tages nicht mehr verfügbar ist. Eine Zusammenfassung des Berichts als HTML gibt es auch hier. Unten folgt der Hinweis auf eine und eine kurze Zusammenfassung der Präsentation zweier USIP-Mitarbeiter über die Lessons Learned des bisherigen Einsatzes vom November 2006.

The UN Offensive
As early as August 2006, in response to intergang fighting that caused the deaths of twenty-two people, Sri Lankan UN military forces had occupied twenty static points in Martissant, a slum in southern Port-au-Prince with a long history of violence and gang rivalry. Over the succeeding months, MINUSTAH expanded its patrols, improved relations
with the community, and established a central strongpoint at the junction of three main gang territories. Following President Préval’s call for action in November 2006, MINUSTAH Police Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) teams launched a series of joint arrest operations with their HNP counterparts. UN military forces provided the outer security
cordon. The principal target was a gang leader known as “Roudy,” since MINUSTAH’s Joint Mission Analysis Center (JMAC) had the best information on him. These operations, which resulted in nearly a hundred arrests, provided valuable experience and served as a trial run for subsequent incursions into Cité Soleil.
In mid-December, the Haitian secretary of state for public security gave directions to arrest a notorious Cité Soleil‐based gang leader known as “Belony.” JMAC focused its sources on this target, resulting in two operations to arrest him when he was outside Cité Soleil—one of which came within minutes of success. After these attempts failed, the director general of the HNP decided to go into Cité Soleil to get Belony. Since the UN Police and the HNP did not have the capacity for such an aggressive operation, they sought military support. After intervention by the SRSG, the force commander was persuaded to mount the operation.
The initial incursion into Cité Soleil, mounted on December 22, was a police-led operation, but the threat had escalated well beyond the level previously encountered in Cité Militaire and Martissant. Belony’s compound was heavily fortified, and members of his gang were well armed; concrete walls and tank traps blocked all access routes. The United Nations expected to meet stiff resistance. The plan involved the police in the lead using a Chinese FPU, the Jordanian SWAT contingent, and the SWAT unit from the Haitian National Police. The Brazilian battalion was in a supporting role. The objective was to arrest Belony and rescue kidnap victims that the United Nations believed were being held at his headquarters in the Bois Neuf section of Cité Soleil.
In the early morning hours of December 22, the Chinese FPU’s armored personnel carriers (APCs) turned into the narrow lanes leading to Belony’s compound and immediately were engaged by hostile fire. Unfortunately, military combat engineers had failed to remove tank traps, so the APCs were unable to reach the gang’s compound. The convoy made it to about sixty meters from its objective before being forced to retreat.
On December 28, MINUSTAH military and police forces, acting in support of the HNP, conducted a second assault, which destroyed part of the gang’s compound. Dismounted Bolivian Special Forces soldiers fired four rocket-propelled grenades into the building where Belony was believed to be, but he escaped.
With the arrival of a new force commander in January 2007, MINUSTAH military forces mounted a concerted assault on the gangs on January 24. During the night, UN military forces led by the Brazilian battalion occupied a partially completed two-story concrete structure with faded blue walls, known locally as the “Blue House.” The building provided a commanding view into the compound of Evans, the most powerful gang leader in Cité Soleil. At sunrise, gang members saw UN soldiers on the rooftop of the Blue House and began an armed assault against the structure, sparking a firefight that lasted into the afternoon.
At that point, the International Committee of the Red Cross arranged a truce to evacuate the wounded. Evans exploited this by mobilizing neighborhood civilians to take to the streets with white flags to stage a “demonstration” against the United Nations.
Faced with the choice of firing on unarmed civilians or suspending the operation, the UN military commander requested police assistance. Although MINUSTAH Police had not participated in planning the operation, the police commissioner had taken the precaution of placing an FPU on standby when he learned that the assault was underway. Within fifteen minutes, the FPU arrived, outfitted with nonlethal riot control capabilities, and safely cleared the streets of demonstrators. The UN military resumed the operation, eventually capturing the gang’s headquarters. Evans fled but was arrested in March in the southern coastal town of Les Cayes.
Following this operation, UN military and police units working with the Haitian National Police moved neighborhood by neighborhood throughout Cité Soleil, arresting gang leaders or forcing them to flee. Once the United Nations established that it was prepared to use superior force, resistance from the gangs quickly diminished. Gang members deserted their leaders and sought to blend into the population. Haitian gangs proved to be collections of individuals who formed around brutal and charismatic leaders, unlike the hierarchical, tightly organized turf-based institutions found in the United States. By March 2007, the United Nations had regained control of Cité Soleil. Once the gangs had
been flushed from their sanctuaries, with support from police-led operations by UN Police and the HNP, some eight hundred gang members were eventually arrested, and all but one gang leader was either apprehended or killed.

The UN campaign against the gangs was not without costs for the residents of Cité Soleil. In a survey conducted by Group Croissance on behalf of the United States Institute of Peace in early 2008, 52 percent of respondents reported that family members, friends, or neighbors, including women and children, were killed or wounded during the fighting with the gangs. (These reports were anecdotal and could not be confirmed by official statistics or death certificates.)1 In the tightly crowded living areas in Cité Soleil, houses made of plywood, cardboard, and corrugated metal offered little protection from the military assault rifles and machine guns used by both sides. The gangs had little interest in imposing fire discipline, while the United Nations was attacking entrenched and heavily defended positions using the heavy machine guns on its APCs and the automatic weapons issued to its troops. Some of the respondents specified that casualties were inflicted by MINUSTAH, but most were uncertain about the source of the fire. All gave horrific descriptions of the fighting. Civilians were trapped in their homes or caught in cross fires,
some buildings were crushed by UN vehicles or set aflame leaving residents homeless. UN troops used teargas in areas where civilians had no protection. Many said the damage to their homes and shops had not been repaired and that they were made homeless. Despite the casualties, material losses, and delays in making repairs 97 percent of respondents believed that the UN crackdown on the gangs was justified.
The impact of the campaign against the gangs has been profound. Cité Soleil, which previously had been viewed by international organizations primarily through the narrow viewing slots of APCs, is now accessible to civilian assistance providers in soft-sided vehicles. The local population is able to move about freely, albeit with the continued presence of MINUSTAH military and police patrols, which are accompanied by a member of the HNP whenever possible. The community is no longer terrorized and intimidated. A survey conducted for the U.S. State Department’s Haiti Stabilization Initiative (HSI) in November 2007 found that 98 percent of Cité Soleil residents felt safer than they had six months earlier, and 85 percent reported that they could conduct their daily activities without fear of intimidation or extortion.2 Harassing shots at UN strongpoints have virtually ceased. Kidnappings have dropped below 20 percent of their previous levels. Residents are reporting crimes to the police, and other violent crime has been substantially reduced. Perhaps most indicative of the change in orientation of the population, the inhabitants of Cité Soleil even volunteered information to police that led to the arrest of gang leaders and confiscation of arms caches in the aftermath of the February 2007 campaign.

Als Quelle für die fast schon hundertzehnprozentige Zustimmung der Bevölkerung wird angegeben:
“CHF International, “Study on the United Nations Crackdown on Gangs in Haiti: Citizens Perspectives,”
March 2008″

Leider konnte ich dieses Dokument nicht finden.

Empfehlungen für ein (noch) robusteres Mandat

Unter Empfehlungen spricht sich das United State Institute for Peace im Anschluss insbesondere dafür aus, die “Intelligence” beim Peacekeeping auszubauen (in diesem Fall das JMAC) und die Soldaten mit (noch) robusteren Einsatzregeln auszustatten und nationale Einschränkungen der jeweiligen Kontingente beim Einsatz von Waffengewalt zu unterbinden. Das (Kriegs-)Völkerrecht wird dabei explizit relativiert und für eine “Weiterentwicklung” der Peacekeeping-Doktrin geworben:

The recently promulgated UN capstone doctrine for peacekeeping recognizes that when “‘the lingering forces of war and violence threaten a fragile peace or continue to prey upon a vulnerable population’ the mission may have to use force preemptively to implement its mandate and to protect civilians.” Although the doctrine regards peacekeeping and peace enforcement as distinct activities, equating the latter to war, it does recognize the need for mandate enforcement when missions are threatened by violent obstruction from illegal armed groups. In the discussion of impartiality, the capstone doctrine advises that “Just as a good referee is impartial but will penalize infractions, so a peacekeeping operation should not condone actions by the parties that violate the undertakings of the peace process or the international norms and principles that a UN peacekeeping operation upholds.”
Beyond the recognition that mandate enforcement is an essential component of peacekeeping, however, there are no guidelines or precepts to suggest how this most daunting of peacekeeping tasks should be conducted. After examining doctrine produced by Britain, France, India, and the United States, William Durch finds that there is a growing convergence around the notion of blending counterinsurgency principles with the core peacekeeping concepts as a basis for mandate enforcement.12 DPKO should work to complement its existing capstone doctrine by establishing doctrine for field operations that specifies when and how to defend and enforce its mandates. As a fundamental imperative, mission leadership should be guided by the principle that it will actively support the efforts of
those who support the mandate, and actively oppose those who seek to obstruct it—especially those who engage in violence.

Die erwähnte Präsentation von William Durch findet sich hier.

Ebenfalls auf der Homepage des United State Institute for Peace findet sich außerdem eine Präsentation. Leider konnte ich nicht herausfinden, wer die Urheber sind, aber sicherlich handelt es sich um Militärs. Folgende Lessons Learned werden genannt:
- INFRASTRUCTURE IMPROVEMENTS ALONG WITH THE MILITARY OPERATIONS
- TRAINING TROOPS ACCORDING TO THE RULES OF ENGAGEMENT OF CHAPTER VII
- MAKING USE OF NON-LETHAL WEAPONS
- TEACHING THE TROOPS THE LANGUAGE OF THE COUNTRY WHERE THEY WILL BE DEPLOYED
- OCCUPYING PERMANENTLY STRONG POINTS INSIDE THE CRITICAL AREAS
- EMPLOYING SPECIAL FORCES UNITS
- BEING PROACTIVE IN HUMANITARIAN AND CIVILIAN ACTIONS
- OFFICERS AND NCO`s BEING AWARE OF THE HISTORY AND CULTURE OF THE COUNTRY
- IMPROVING FIRST AID TRAINING

Auch wenn das alles recht banal und verdächtig nach der US-Aufstandsbekämpfungs klingt, lohnt sich ein Blick in die Präsentation. Dort sieht man, wie die Blauhelme Straßen und Polizeiposten bauen, und auf Luftaufnahmen auch, wie das so aussieht, wenn mitten im Slum ein Militärlager errichtet wurde. Vorsicht: Auf den letzten fünf Folien sind ziemlich ekelhafte Verletzungen zu sehen, die man nicht unbeding gesehen haben muss.

Haiti und die Gefahren der “Verantwortung zum Schutz”

Donnerstag, 23. April 2009

Der kanadische Autor Anthony Fenton hat einen hervorragenden Artikel über “Haiti and the Dangers of Responsibility to Protect (R2P)” veröffentlicht. Obwohl der Text vielleicht etwas zu sehr das Bild einer imperilistischen US-amerikanisch-kanadischen Verschwörung gegen die nicht näher differenzierte Bewegung Aristides bemüht, ist der Artikel absolut lesenswert. Er handelt im Kern nicht von der militärischen Besatzung Haitis unter UN-Mandat, die Fenton als “lower intensity COIN war” gegen die Bewegung Lavalas und die Gegner der Besatzung bezeichnet. Vielmehr werden die kanadische und die US-amerikanische Rolle bei der Destabilisierung der Regierung Aristide zwischen 2000 und 2004 ziemlich detailliert dargestellt. Parallel dazu beschreibt Fenton, wie im selben Zeitraum und teilweise von denselben Akteuren die Debatte um die “Verantwortung zum Schutz” vorangetrieben und versucht wurde, diese als völkerrechtliche Norm zu etablieren. Dies macht er aufgrund solider Recherchen und beweist eine gute Kentniss der R2P-Debatte und ihrer Akteure. Er stellt die R2P gekonnt in den Kontext ähnlicher Konzepte bzw. verschiedener Umsetzungsformen, wie das Protektorat (Trusteeship) und die geteilte Souveränität (shared sovereignty). Gekonnt entlarvt er dabei einige grundlegende Begriffe der Global Governance-Rhetorik:

As it turned out, the “international community” opted to officially abandon the rhetoric of trusteeship, following both the advice of Graham, as well as one of the concept’s 21st century progenitors, Stephen Krasner. Writing in the NED’s Journal of Democracy in 2005, Krasner reasoned that “for policy purposes,” “shared sovereignty” should be termed “partnerships,” in order to simultaneously undermine and pay lip service to state sovereignty. The distinction is important. By claiming that they are merely a collective of “donors” who are “accompanying” their “partner,” Haiti, the foreign interveners try and render themselves unaccountable for their actions. If things go wrong, the blame can be placed on Haitians themselves. __
Another, related concept that has been abandoned rhetorically but applied in actuality in Haiti is that of the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ (R2P) doctrine. Alongside the multi-track process of destabilizing Haiti in the period 2000-2004, a radical reconfiguration of how state sovereignty is to be viewed began to be formalized. In the middle of this process, Haiti was characterized by some as an ‘ideal R2P situation.’

Fenton betrachtet dabei weniger die heutige Besatzung, die UN-mandatierte und den Vorgaben der USA, Kandas und Frankreich folgende Intervention in Haiti als Umsetzung der R2P, sondern eben die vorangegangenen Bemühungen, die Haitianische Regierung zu schwächen. Denn er versteht die R2P weniger als Legitimationsmuster für militärische Einsätze, denn als Vorgabe für finanzielle Sanktionen oder die Unterstützung von oppositionellen Gruppen um ein ungeliebtes Regime zu stürzen:

R2P typifies in doctrinal form the ‘evolution of the conventional concept of sovereignty’ by “considered people.” In short, R2P has been defined as a situation wherein “the power of the sovereign state can be legitimately revoked if the international community decides that the state is not protecting its citizens.” Importantly, the state’s power is not only taken in extreme instances, via military intervention. Sovereignty can also be undermined by policies imposed under the “preventive” and “rebuilding” phases of the R2P spectrum, often in the form of economic sanctions, “coercive diplomacy,” “democracy promotion,” “good governance,” and structural adjustment programs…
Although there is no space for an analysis of the entire ICISS report here, it is worth noting that it stressed that military intervention was considered a last resort, and that attention is to be paid to “direct prevention efforts.” According to the ICISS, such measures can “make it absolutely unnecessary to employ directly coercive measures against the state concerned.”
Examples of preventive measures listed that can be found in the case of pre-coup Haiti include “political and diplomatic” efforts such as “friends groups,” (i.e. the ‘Friends of Haiti), or “problem-solving workshops” (i.e. the ‘Ottawa Initiative on Haiti’). More importantly for the purposes of this article, the ICISS lists “economic direct preventive measures,” sometimes of “a more coercive nature” that can be employed, such as “threats of trade and financial sanctions…threats to withdraw IMF or World Bank support; and the curtailment of aid and other assistance.”

Deshalb beschreibt er in seinem Artikel ausführlich, wie die USA und Kanada insbesondere 2002 Ausschüttungen der Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) an Haiti durch diplomatischen Druck verzögerten, obwohl sich beide Regierungen im Klaren sein mussten, dass dies nicht nur die Regierung Aristides schwächt, sondern auch die Bevölkerung des Landes hart treffen wird:

Another Canadian memo drafted eight months before Aristide’s ouster (June 10, 2003) noted how “the gradual suspension of most external assistance” and the channeling of funds away from the Haitian state to NGO’s had the result of weakening the government; “Accordingly, the State’s capacity to respond to the needs of the population has been greatly diminished.” Publicly, however, it was Haiti’s “failure” and “bad governance,” coupled with Aristide’s increasingly “authoritarian” ways, that diminished the State’s capacity.
No one knows how many Haitians lives were affected by this “gradual suspension” of aid. As Todd Howland of the RFK Memorial Foundation said, as a result of these obstructions, “Haitians have died. There have been actual deaths linked to the fact that the IDB never disbursed these loans.”

Je mehr sich andeutete, dass dies auf den mehr oder minder gewaltsamen Sturz der Regierung hinauslaufen würde, desto weniger wurde jedoch Haiti mit dem philantropischen daherkommenden R2P-Ansatz in Verbindung gebracht. Dies wird u.a. am Beispiel Gareth Evans´, Präsident der International Crisis Group und einer der prominentesten Befürworter der R2P, dargestellt:

In purporting to respond to critics of R2P in his new book, “The Responsibility to Protect: Ending Mass Atrocity Crimes Once and For All”, Gareth Evans, the person who is perhaps R2P’s leading lobbyist, attempts to dismiss “those who retain a strong aversion to imperialism, or perceived neo-imperialism” as erecting “straw men” by insisting on “hammer[ing] away at humanitarian intervention as the target, and only incidentally mention R2P…without acknowledging that the debate has moved on and the extent to which their concerns have already been conceptually accommodated.”
Unfortunately for Evans, no such ‘conceptual accommodation’ that would allow for the destabilization, regime change, and counterinsurgency war waged against Haiti, can be found to exist. As such, it seems reasonable to suggest that until the appropriate parties are held accountable for their policies, it is impossible to “move on.” Evans himself, as the president and CEO of the International Crisis Group (ICG), repeatedly cites ICG documents throughout his book. But when it comes to Haiti, there is not a single explicit reference to the situation in Haiti for the period covering 2004-2006 (despite the fact the ICG issued six Haiti-specific reports during the period).36 __
Writing about the topic of economic sanctions in a section titled ‘Operationalizing the Responsibility to Protect,” Evans warns, without mentioning Haiti, that “the capacity of financial sanctions to do real damage…should never be underestimated.” __
Far from exceptional, Evans’ evasion of R2P’s destructive application in Haiti appears to be standard fare. Indeed, noting the absence of such discussion in the Canadian discourse, one R2P advocate has noted, “The Canadian government’s justification for the 2004 intervention in Haiti, without open debate from an R2P perspective, has damaged the R2P campaign, particularly in Latin America and the Caribbean.”

Denn damit sich die R2P bzw. geteilte Suveränität als völkerrechtliche Norm bzw. als Völkergewohnheitsrecht durchsetzt, müssen möglichst viele Staaten zumindest Lippenbekenntnisse hierfür abliefern. Die Staaten des globalen Südens jedoch, sind da natürlich vorsichtig. Mit der heutigen Situation in Haiti als Ergebnis angewandter Schutzverantwortung aber dürften auch die philantropisch motivierten Menschenrechtskrieger, die notwendig sind, um diese imperialen Konzepte auch im globalen Norden humanistisch ummäntelt zu legitimieren, nicht oder besser noch vom Gegenteil überzeugt werden.

Nicht zentral, aber am Rande geht Fenton auch noch auf die zu erwartende Unterstützung der R2P durch die neue US-Regierung ein. Denn dieses Konzept passe hervorragend in die sich herauskristallisierende außenpolitische Konzeption Obamas:

Far more than pre-emptive, unilateral wars, R2P appears to be the perfect complement to the U.S.’s expanding counterinsurgency and emerging “smart power” doctrines, to which Obama has already indicated a commitment. Some of Obama’s key cabinet picks (namely Susan Rice, and Hillary Clinton) and advisors close to the incoming administration’s camp (most notably top Clinton advisor Lee Feinstein, Samantha Power, and Anne-Marie Slaughter) are well-known advocates for R2P’s “operationalization.”

Und weil der Text so gut und wichtig ist, dass er nicht in den Weiten des internets verloren geht, stelle ich ihn hier am Schluss nochmal komplett ein.

Haiti and the Dangers of Responsibility to Protect (R2P)
by Anthony Fenton
www.zcommunications.org/, December 27, 2008

Introduction __
In 2004, Haiti’s democratically-elected president, Jean Bertrand Aristide, was overthrown by a small but well organized and funded opposition movement backed by the most powerful members of the “international community” - the U.S., Canada, and France. __
Doing what his father and Bill Clinton were unable to before him, President George W. Bush led the way in answering the question that had vexed consecutive administrations since Haiti’s popular movement swept the Duvalier’s totalitarian dynasty from power in 1986: “Who will rid me of this turbulent priest?” __
In December of 2005, Fabiola Cordova, the program officer who was overseeing the National Endowment for Democracy’s (NED) burgeoning program in Haiti described how, even after more than a decade of efforts to undermine, demonize, and isolate Aristide leading up to the 2004 coup, the U.S. based their political operations on the following calculation: __
“Aristide really had 70% of the popular support and then the 120 other parties had the thirty per cent split in one hundred and twenty different ways, which is basically impossible to compete [with]…” __
The goal, then, was to us “even the [political] playing field’ inside of Haiti under the auspices of ‘promoting democracy.” This translated to the establishment of policies operating in parallel fashion on several tracks. The political opposition, factions of which were linked to the ‘rebel’ paramilitary movement that would emerge, was bolstered in attempt to consolidate it as a united movement against Aristide. Meanwhile, Aristide’s government was simultaneously isolated diplomatically, a de facto economic embargo was placed on his government, and aid money was circumvented around the government and given to NGO’s, many of which helped form the opposition. __
Combined with a variety of other factors, the strategy had the effect of creating an enabling environment for Aristide’s extra-constitutional removal from power. __
With UN Security Council authorization, the U.S., Canada, France, and Chile were the first countries to send their militaries in to “stabilize” the country. They quickly joined forces with the anti-Aristide political opposition and “rebel” insurgency. On the one hand, they set up a puppet regime that was swept clear of Aristide’s Lavalas party, which was occupied by Western ‘technical assistants’ and Western-friendly ‘technocrats.’ On the other hand, the UN occupying forces joined the anti-Aristide insurgency and waged a counterinsurgency (COIN) war against Lavalas, whose members were included among those identified as anti-occupation ‘insurgents.’ __
By the end of the summer of 2004, the UN’s Multilateral-Interim Force (MIF) had morphed into the Brazilian-led MINUSTAH. A lower intensity COIN war continued through 2006; according to various reports, thousands of Haitians - civilians, militants, non-violent activists - lost their lives to conflict during this period.
The UN’s military and policing occupation continues today, with continuing Brazilian leadership alongside the forces of ten other Latin American countries, plus Jordan, Sri Lanka, and the Philippines. Despite having largely receded from their muscular military role, the U.S., Canada, and France remain, individually, the three most powerful external political actors in Haiti. __
Needless to say, the kind of ’stability’ sought by the foreign interveners has not yet arrived; nearly five years of UN-sanctioned occupation has not improved life for most Haitians; incredibly, a popular movement still exists calling for the return of exiled former President Aristide. Few would contest the claim that, were he to return to Haiti and run in a future election, Aristide would win in a landslide.
__
Protecting Haitians, ‘Sharing’ their Sovereignty __
Some comments published recently by the former commander-in-chief of the Chilean Army, Juan Emilio Cheyre, speak to the need to return our attention to the roots of the Haiti intervention. Having just returned from Haiti, Cheyre, now the director of an elite Chilean think tank, wrote a column calling for a reduction of the Haiti’s sovereignty, which he thinks should be placed in “de facto trust” with the international community. Together, the foreigners and Haiti would exercise a sort of “shared sovereignty.” Although a “drastic option,” Haiti is, according to the retired general, after all, a “failed state.” The evolution of “the conventional concept of sovereignty,” Cheyre reasons, renders foreign tutelage over Haiti a necessary evil. __
Cheyre is only the latest in a long line of foreigners to publicly pontificate on the neo-colonization of Haiti. __
Speaking to a Canadian parliamentary committee only a few weeks after Aristide’s removal, the head of a Canadian think tank and ‘democracy’ promotion NGO, John Graham of the Canadian Foundation for the Americas (FOCAL), wanted to avoid having “the stones of anti-colonialism hurled,” at the foreign trustees, but at the same time felt that some measure of foreign control over the Haitian state was necessary: __
“We don’t want to call it a trusteeship, but we didn’t call Bosnia a trusteeship. We didn’t call East Timor a trusteeship. But some control has to be vested in the international community to give Haiti a beginning.” __
As it turned out, the “international community” opted to officially abandon the rhetoric of trusteeship, following both the advice of Graham, as well as one of the concept’s 21st century progenitors, Stephen Krasner. Writing in the NED’s Journal of Democracy in 2005, Krasner reasoned that “for policy purposes,” “shared sovereignty” should be termed “partnerships,” in order to simultaneously undermine and pay lip service to state sovereignty. The distinction is important. By claiming that they are merely a collective of “donors” who are “accompanying” their “partner,” Haiti, the foreign interveners try and render themselves unaccountable for their actions. If things go wrong, the blame can be placed on Haitians themselves. __
Another, related concept that has been abandoned rhetorically but applied in actuality in Haiti is that of the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ (R2P) doctrine. Alongside the multi-track process of destabilizing Haiti in the period 2000-2004, a radical reconfiguration of how state sovereignty is to be viewed began to be formalized. In the middle of this process, Haiti was characterized by some as an ‘ideal R2P situation.’ Since the coup, however, and since the R2P is becoming embedded in international institutions and law, Haiti has dropped off the R2P radar. Dozens of papers, panels, symposiums, and conferences seem to have studiously avoided Haiti when discussing R2P. __
Although its roots go back at last as far as the conceptualization of the idea of “sovereignty as responsibility,” first formulated by the elite Brookings Institution think tank’s Francis Deng with generous funding from the Carnegie foundation in the early 1990s11, R2P made its most serious advancement with the 2001 Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS).
The ICISS was spearheaded and coordinated by the Canadian government beginning in 2000, and, importantly received crucial seed money from several key U.S.-based liberal philanthropic foundations. As two U.S.-based R2P advocates, Adelle Simmons and April Donnellan wrote recently, the R2P simply “would not have come about without the support of philanthropy.”
Historically, many foundations have undertaken extensive programming abroad, at arms length but also inextricable from the interests of U.S. imperialism. In the case of R2P, philanthropy is said to possess a “comparative advantage” to the extent that they can contribute “to the larger goal of establishing norms by supporting civil society groups whose work complement[s] and reinforce[s] governments or official organizations.”
Indicative of the elitist nature of R2P’s development, an American R2P advocate described how an early R2P conference he helped organize was, in effect “an insiders game to discuss and decide what some of the elements of the Responsibility to Protect doctrine should be so that the political extremists wouldn’t get a hold of it before considered people were able to define it.” __
R2P typifies in doctrinal form the ‘evolution of the conventional concept of sovereignty’ by “considered people.” In short, R2P has been defined as a situation wherein “the power of the sovereign state can be legitimately revoked if the international community decides that the state is not protecting its citizens.” Importantly, the state’s power is not only taken in extreme instances, via military intervention. Sovereignty can also be undermined by policies imposed under the “preventive” and “rebuilding” phases of the R2P spectrum, often in the form of economic sanctions, “coercive diplomacy,” “democracy promotion,” “good governance,” and structural adjustment programs. __
For myriad reasons, many of which are illustrated by the case of Haiti, R2P remains relevant for die hard supporters of sovereignty, not the least of which due to the fact that the Haiti intervention is seen by some as a model for future interventions in the hemisphere. __
Providing a case in point in the fall of 2005, a Canadian diplomat told a group of journalists gathered in Canada’s austere Port au Prince embassy that Haiti is “an example for the crisis to come in this hemisphere. We could think, for example, what will happen when Cuba will be in transition…”__
Not only for Cuba, who, for good reason, have remained one of the few outspoken critics of R2P, but for the entire world, the case of Haiti shows that the attempted institutionalization of this doctrine carries with it serious, potential dangers. __
Following the controversial inclusion of the (albeit watered-down) R2P language in the UN’s 2005 World Summit Outcome document, a veritable, well-funded “R2P Lobby” has stealthily emerged to advance and consolidate the doctrine as a ‘global norm.’ Some lessons from R2P’s application in Haiti offer some sobering reasons to monitor, and, if necessary, counter R2P’s consolidation. __

R2P’s Haitian Genesis __
On the last weekend of January 2003, the Canadian government hosted a secret meeting to discuss Haiti’s future. Only informing the Haitian government after the fact, the “Ottawa Initiative on Haiti,” was attended by representatives of the self-identified “friends of Haiti,” including, chiefly, the U.S., Canada, and France, along with representatives from the EU and OAS. __
Although the details of the meeting remain disputed - the relevant portions of declassified documents describing the meeting were redacted - the journalist who broke the story of the meeting, Michel Vastel, stands by his claim that the meeting’s attendees arrived at “a consensus that ‘Aristide should go.’” Vastel claims that the French government “suggested there should be a ‘trusteeship’ like there was in Kosovo. That was not an intervention, they said, that was their responsibility - all these countries - to protect.” __
One of Vastel’s sources for the story was then-Canadian Secretary of State for Latin America and Liberal Member of Parliament Denis Paradis, who organized the meeting. In an interview following Aristide’s removal in 2004, Paradis denied that Aristide’s ouster was discussed, but said that R2P was the “thematic that went under the whole meeting,” and that “if there is one place where the principles of this ‘responsibility to protect’ would apply around the world, it’s Haiti.” __
Paradis’s statements are important to the extent that Canadian and UN officials were loathe to publicly tout Haiti as an example of R2P’s application, especially when at the same time R2P advocates were busily lobbying to get it adopted at the 2005 UN Summit. __
Nevertheless, there is some indication that Haiti was seen by Canadian officialdom as an ideal R2P situation. In a declassified talking points memo from Canada’s Department of Foreign Affairs dated 26 March 2004 titled “Canada’s Responsibility to Protect Follow-up Efforts,” the following question is posed: “Why is Canada not applying The Responsibility to Protect in the case of Haiti?” The answer is revealing. __
On the one hand, the R2P was, at that point, “a report only” and “not considered part of customary international law,” although this was (and remains) the goal. On the other hand, “Canada’s actions in the case of Haiti are entirely consistent with our support for R2P’s core-findings…” __
Official rhetoric aside, there are other sets of since-declassified memos that illustrate the extent to which ‘R2P principles’ were applied, not to ‘protect’ Haitians, but to destabilize the democratically elected government in preparation for its overthrow. __
There is an interesting convergence that is worth noting between Canada’s unprecedented leadership role in Haiti, and its leadership role in advancing the R2P doctrine. As Paul Martin, the Prime Minister at the time of both the coup d’etat in Haiti and R2P’s adoption in 2005, wrote in his recently published memoir, Canadian leadership on R2P was desirable since, as Canada “was never a colonial power, and no one suspects us of neo-colonial ambitions, we are able to come to this work with ‘clean hands.’” __
Such sentiments were consistent with those expressed by John Graham’s colleague at FOCAL, Carlo Dade, during Parliament’s post-coup hearings on Haiti, who referred to Canada’s “perception in the region as a counterweight to what is viewed as heavy U.S. involvement in the region.” It was this perception that compelled the U.S. to support a Canadian leadership role both in Haiti and on the R2P file. __
Although there is no space for an analysis of the entire ICISS report here, it is worth noting that it stressed that military intervention was considered a last resort, and that attention is to be paid to “direct prevention efforts.” According to the ICISS, such measures can “make it absolutely unnecessary to employ directly coercive measures against the state concerned.” __
Examples of preventive measures listed that can be found in the case of pre-coup Haiti include “political and diplomatic” efforts such as “friends groups,” (i.e. the ‘Friends of Haiti), or “problem-solving workshops” (i.e. the ‘Ottawa Initiative on Haiti’). More importantly for the purposes of this article, the ICISS lists “economic direct preventive measures,” sometimes of “a more coercive nature” that can be employed, such as “threats of trade and financial sanctions…threats to withdraw IMF or World Bank support; and the curtailment of aid and other assistance.” __
It is no coincidence that all of these “preventive” economic measures were undertaken against Haiti beginning immediately following Aristide’s landslide election in 2000, up to the February 29, 2004 regime change. __
On the one hand, the ICISS states that such “tough threatened direct prevention efforts can be important in eliminating the need to actually resort to coercive measures, including the use of force.” __
On the other hand, the authors note that some of the unintended consequences of such measures, responsibility for which rests with the state being “helped,” finds that “those who wish to resist external efforts to help may well, in so doing, increase the risk of inducing increased external involvement, the application of more coercive measures, and in extreme cases, external military intervention.” __
Here is where some declassified documents from U.S. and Canadian officials help illustrate a key point with respect to R2P. It wasn’t the intransigence of Aristide’s government that led to “increased external involvement,” and, eventually the “extreme case” of military intervention. Rather, using key multilateral institutions in conjunction with the other destabilizing efforts noted above, the U.S. and Canada themselves knowingly fostered conditions of “chaos” that could only lead to military intervention. __
One illustration of this concerns the deliberate holding-up of already approved loans for Haiti from the Inter-American Development Bank in 2001-2002. The details are drawn from the joint report, “Wòch nan Soley: The Denial of the Right to Water in Haiti,” by New York University’s Centre for Human Rights and Global Justice, the NYU School of Law’s International Human Rights Clinic, Dr. Paul Farmer’s Partners in Health, and the Robert F. Kennedy Memorial Center for Human Rights. __
This report shows, through an analysis of documents obtained via Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), that “political” motivations compelled the U.S. Treasury Department, working through the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), to undertake “continuous efforts to block Haiti’s access to loans in response to these political concerns.” Only as “a reward for [the U.S.'s desired] political change in Haiti,” would the previously approved loans be dispersed. Notably, such loans were needed in order to provide essential life requirements to the people, such as water and health care. __
Importantly, the U.S. (and, evidently, Canadian) obstruction of these loans was a violation of the IDB’s Charter, which states that the IDB “shall not interfere in the political affairs of any member.” In the report, one U.S. official is cited, relaying to the Treasury Department that, in reality, there were “no obstacles to [the loan's] disbursement.” There was however, a way to manufacture obstacles, by undertaking to “slow” the process of releasing Haiti’s desperately needed funds, in accordance with U.S. political objectives. __
Canada’s role is not mentioned in the report, which might explain the Canadian media’s failure to report on its findings. __
One might reasonably assume that Canada was complicit with this process: media talking points for the Foreign Affairs bureau at the time justified Canada’s support for the policy, stating that Haiti must take steps “toward resolving the political situation before the resumption of assistance by the international community, particularly the IFI’s.” __
Such assumptions appear to be confirmed by documents obtained via Canada’s Access to Information Act (ATI’s).29 A few examples from these documents will show how Canada followed the policy of “slowing” the disbursement of loans to Haiti in lockstep with the U.S. __
Wòch nan Soley notes how the Organization of American States (OAS) was drawn into the center of the political struggle, even though in fact “the OAS position [on the loans] was irrelevant to the disbursement process.” Nevertheless, when brought in to assess the situation, OAS officials (led by U.S. Assistant Secretary General Luigi Einaudi, who, only weeks before Aristide’s ouster, publicly lamented that “the international community is so screwed up and divided that it is letting Haitians run Haiti”) agreed that the loans’ release “should be proportional to President Aristide’s progress toward ending political problems between rival parties in Haiti.” __
In a memorandum distributed by Canada’s Department of Foreign Affairs (DFAIT), on January 25, 2002, the “Canadian position” on the disbursement of loans and on the role of the OAS is stated explicitly: __
“The IDB (with the support of Canada as a member of the Council) continues to require a green light from the OAS…before supporting the resumption of large scale assistance [to Haiti].” __
Although as noted above, the OAS position was “irrelevant” to the releasing of funds, the Canadians imposed with the U.S. the belief that a “green light” from the OAS was still necessary. __
Consistent with the ICISS report, the memo correctly anticipates that a maintenance of the status quo policy, or, in the words of Canadian officials, the “consequence of inaction” on the part of the ‘Friends of Haiti’ would “lead to the descent of Haiti into chaos.” __
A month later, an Intelligence Assessment from the Canadian Prime Minister’s secretive Privy Council Office further stated that “Aristide must access blocked foreign aid or continue to lose ground, and he knows it.” __
In another memo, Canadian officials proudly refer to the “cooperative Canada-US working relationship” on the Haiti file. Not only was Canada closely coordinating its policy with the US, once the Bush administration took over the file from President Clinton, Canada virtually stood alone with the U.S. in defiance of a majority of the OAS member states who wanted, at the very least, for the loans to be disbursed. __
A Canadian memo dated July 25, 2002 acknowledges how the “majority” of the member states who comprise the OAS Permanent Council “favour release of some IFI funding” to Haiti. Only the U.S. and Canada stood in the way of this, even as Haiti’s ambassador complained that “No political group has the right to hold a Government and a people hostage.” _
_A few days later, one day before a major meeting of the Permanent Council (July 30, 2002), Canadian officials indicated that an exasperated Haiti planned to request approval of a resolution that would lead to a lifting of the barriers to the disbursement of loans. A Canadian official, who met directly with Haiti’s ambassador, conveyed to him “that Canada would not be in a position to support the Haitian draft.” __
Noting that the Haitian ambassador seemed to feel, nevertheless, that he “has the numbers necessary to push the resolution through,” the Canadian official said, “On straight numbers, he is probably correct - but at the moment, there are two key players outside of the tent.”
In case there is any mistake over who the “two key players outside of the tent” were, the next day, following the Permanent Council meeting where Haiti tried to table their resolution that would free up the aid, a Canadian official boasted how, “Firm opposition to the Haitian draft from USA and Canada…resulted in Haitian indication of willingness to work on revisions to the text.” __
Although forced to water down the resolution in order to make “it…acceptable to all,” that is, to Canada and the U.S., the Haitian ambassador defiantly decried to the Council that “Haiti will not accept the tutorship of the international community, or that of an institution which is working to carry out the agenda of some other government.” The ambassador added that “forcing Haiti to accept any outside framework is incompatible with the sovereign law of the people and government.” __
Nevertheless, the U.S.-Canadian “slowing” process yielded the desired result. By January of 2003, not long before the ‘Ottawa Initiative’ meeting, Canadian intelligence analysts would accurately predict that circumstances had deteriorated so much that “Aristide…could be forced to resign or could face a coup.” They even presciently noted how “Ex-military power brokers may be preparing for ‘Regime Change,’” and that according to “some observers,” it was conceivable that “hundreds of ex-soldiers could be mobilized, should conditions deteriorate sufficiently and a suitable leader appear.” __
Another Canadian memo drafted eight months before Aristide’s ouster (June 10, 2003) noted how “the gradual suspension of most external assistance” and the channeling of funds away from the Haitian state to NGO’s had the result of weakening the government; “Accordingly, the State’s capacity to respond to the needs of the population has been greatly diminished.” Publicly, however, it was Haiti’s “failure” and “bad governance,” coupled with Aristide’s increasingly “authoritarian” ways, that diminished the State’s capacity. __
No one knows how many Haitians lives were affected by this “gradual suspension” of aid. As Todd Howland of the RFK Memorial Foundation said, as a result of these obstructions, “Haitians have died. There have been actual deaths linked to the fact that the IDB never disbursed these loans.” __
Some $200 million in IDB loans ended up getting approved in late 2003, most of which did not get dispersed until the damage was done, and Aristide was overthrown, after which the International Financial Institution’s condition-laden funding taps opened. This period was described in a World Bank assessment as “a window of opportunity for implementing economic governance reforms…that may be hard for a future government to undo.” Another $215 million was approved during the coup government’s reign in 2005.33 Now, with a government in power that de facto ’shares sovereignty’ with the international community, the IDB is projecting a further $520 million to be dispersed between 2007-2011. __

Conclusion __
A full analysis of the impact and de facto implementation of R2P in Haiti is beyond the scope of this article. However, a few more general points about R2P can be made in closing.
In purporting to respond to critics of R2P in his new book, “The Responsibility to Protect: Ending Mass Atrocity Crimes Once and For All”, Gareth Evans, the person who is perhaps R2P’s leading lobbyist, attempts to dismiss “those who retain a strong aversion to imperialism, or perceived neo-imperialism” as erecting “straw men” by insisting on “hammer[ing] away at humanitarian intervention as the target, and only incidentally mention R2P…without acknowledging that the debate has moved on and the extent to which their concerns have already been conceptually accommodated.”
Unfortunately for Evans, no such ‘conceptual accommodation’ that would allow for the destabilization, regime change, and counterinsurgency war waged against Haiti, can be found to exist. As such, it seems reasonable to suggest that until the appropriate parties are held accountable for their policies, it is impossible to “move on.” Evans himself, as the president and CEO of the International Crisis Group (ICG), repeatedly cites ICG documents throughout his book. But when it comes to Haiti, there is not a single explicit reference to the situation in Haiti for the period covering 2004-2006 (despite the fact the ICG issued six Haiti-specific reports during the period).36 __
Writing about the topic of economic sanctions in a section titled ‘Operationalizing the Responsibility to Protect,” Evans warns, without mentioning Haiti, that “the capacity of financial sanctions to do real damage…should never be underestimated.” __
Far from exceptional, Evans’ evasion of R2P’s destructive application in Haiti appears to be standard fare. Indeed, noting the absence of such discussion in the Canadian discourse, one R2P advocate has noted, “The Canadian government’s justification for the 2004 intervention in Haiti, without open debate from an R2P perspective, has damaged the R2P campaign, particularly in Latin America and the Caribbean.” __
Even if marginalized, criticism of R2P in the case of Haiti is not as obscure as one might assume. In his memoir, Paul Martin describes how the Prime Minister of Jamaica, P.J. Patterson, resistant to the legitimation of the doctrine by the UN, “saw the responsibility to protect in the context of the recent ouster of Jean-Bertrand Aristide in Haiti.” Ever the expert at “personal diplomacy,” Martin was able to “persuade him to change his view, partly because of Canada’s bona fides in the region and in particular with respect to Haiti, as well as by arguing that no intervention would occur without regional approval.” __
The overall process by which such “regional approval” for Haiti’s occupation and the de facto implementation of R2P came about is, again, a topic for another paper. Even if earlier ‘damaged,’ the R2P Lobby’s campaign to achieve acceptance for R2P have proceeded apace since 2005. The doctrine has made inroads in the region more generally outside of Haiti. Earlier this year, a major R2P conference was held in Buenos Ares, Argentina, “Dialogue on Responsibility to Protect: Latin American Perspectives.” This was just one of numerous such conferences being held by the R2P Lobby, with an eye toward creating a “global R2P advocacy movement.” __
Fittingly, one of the two Haitian “civil society” activists to attend the R2P conference was Pierre Esperance, whose organization NCHR (later named RNDDH) actually fabricated the perpetration of “genocide” in Haiti during the “rebels” pre-coup incursion. With Canadian government funding, Esperance’s false claims were responsible for the wrongful imprisonment of Haiti’s Prime Minister, Yvon Neptune. He served more than two years in prison where he nearly died, before being released without charge in July 2006. Esperance’s false accusations helped provide post facto justification for “humanitarian intervention” and the invocation of R2P.
Given what we have seen here, perhaps the most disturbing potential development is that the R2P Lobby’s efforts have received a considerable boost from the election of Barack Obama. Far more than pre-emptive, unilateral wars, R2P appears to be the perfect complement to the U.S.’s expanding counterinsurgency and emerging “smart power” doctrines, to which Obama has already indicated a commitment. Some of Obama’s key cabinet picks (namely Susan Rice, and Hillary Clinton) and advisors close to the incoming administration’s camp (most notably top Clinton advisor Lee Feinstein, Samantha Power, and Anne-Marie Slaughter) are well-known advocates for R2P’s “operationalization.” __
With little sustained criticism of the doctrine, and an elite establishment that is desperate to “re-brand” the U.S. image so that it can “move from eliciting fear and anger to inspiring optimism and hope,” formal adoption of R2P seems possible under Obama, if not likely. __
At the same time, it should be remembered that it was the Bush administration’s consent that allowed for the adoption of R2P language in the 2005 UN World Summit Outcome document. Likewise, the same document formalized “democracy promotion” as the UN’s complement to the Bush-led “Freedom Agenda.” Obama, too, has expressed a commitment to the global “democracy” agenda, the interventionist cousin of the R2P doctrine. __
Equally, as pointed out in a book by a close advisor to Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper, the R2P doctrine, which ” the Canadian government has made…[as] the basis of its international policy in the coming decade,” essentially mirrors in “value motivations” the Bush administration’s 2002 National Security Strategy. Likewise, R2P finds resonance with the what (both Bush’s, and soon to be Obama’s) Secretary of Defense Robert Gates has described as the “balanced strategy” that is necessary for “Reprogramming the Pentagon for a New Age.” __
In Canada, the close affinity between “democracy” promotion and R2P is openly displayed. In Winnipeg recently, NED’s Canadian sister organization, Rights and Democracy, co-hosted a seminar, “Next Steps for Civil Society to Advance The Responsibility to Protect.” Under the Conservative government, Canada has quietly continued support for R2P and its funding has contributed to the growth of a “global R2P coalition.” And waiting in the wings to take political power is the new leader of Canada’s Liberal Party, Michael Ignatieff, cheerleader for the Iraq and Afghanistan wars, advocate of “Empire Lite,” and member of the R2P’s ICISS. _
Although this article has only focused on R2P’s de facto application in one context, the example of Haiti alone, combined with the R2P Lobby’s silence on the Haiti case and its close proximity to other interventionist projects, should compel those who are concerned with the erosion of state sovereignty, the [re-]emergence of a paradigm of “humanitarian imperialism,” and a continuation of the global counterinsurgency campaign (aka ‘war on terror’), to think twice about supporting R2P’s entrenchment as a global norm. __

Anthony Fenton is an independent researcher and journalist based near Vancouver, B.C. __

Annual Review of Global Peace Operations 2009

Dienstag, 07. April 2009

Das Center on International Cooperation (CIC) der New York University hat auch 2009 wieder eine Übersicht und Evaluierung aller UN-Einsätze vorgenommen. Leider ist diese nur käuflich zu erwerben. Die Financial Times hat immerhin einen Artikel dazu veröffentlicht, der die Problematik anschneidet, dass ein Großteil der Soldaten in UN-Einsätzen aus Entwicklungsländern stammt und die Industriestaaten sehr zögerlich sind, Soldaten zu entsenden. Das unterstreicht die FT auch mit einem brauchbaren Schaubild. Außerdem wird hier, in Anlehnung an das von Alain Le Roy (Untergeneralsekretär für Friedenseinsätze) verfasste Vorwort, angedeutet, dass UN-Einsätze nicht unbedingt einfach immer nur personell und vom Aufgabenbereich her erweitert werden können:

United Nations military operations might have reached their limits, with the two largest peacekeeping operations stretched to breaking point in the past year, the organisation’s chief peacekeeper warns in a report to be published on Tuesday.
The warning from Alain Le Roy, under-secretary general for peacekeeping operations, appears in a foreword to the annual peacekeeping survey of the New York-based Center on International Co-operation.
It comes a year after the centre’s last review criticised the security council for authorising big new peacekeeping missions round the world in spite of warnings that demands on troop contributors were overtaking their ability to deliver.
The UN is currently responsible for 18 peace missions worldwide that deploy 112,000 uniformed personnel at the cost of almost $8bn a year. “UN peacekeeping is now at an all-time high,” according to Mr Le Roy.
In the light of the near-collapse last October of the peacekeeping mission in Democratic Republic of the Congo, the UN’s largest, the security council has finally taken note. France and the UK have launched a review on how best to fix a system that one diplomat at the UN described as “breaking at the seams”.
The crisis was highlighted during a rebel offensive in eastern Congo in October, when protesters stoned a UN compound over the alleged failure of peacekeepers to halt the rebel advance.

Dieses Beispiel aus der DR Congo ist ganz spannend, weil es hier fast als eine Art “Befehlsverweigerung” dargestellt wird:

National units of the UN force refused to deploy without orders from their own officers. Lieutenant-general Vicente Díaz de Villegas of Spain quit abruptly after only three weeks in command of the UN force.
Defending his decision not to put forces under his command at risk, General Diaz de Villegas told a Spanish newspaper this month: “There was no assessment of the risks and threats. Security plans had to be revised. There was no plan for intelligence gathering and no reserves.”
Mr Le Roy acknowledges that in Congo and in Sudan’s western Darfur province “UN peacekeepers found themselves in dangerous and violent situations that stretched their ability to function to the very breaking point.”
The centre’s report warns of “the steady blurring of the lines between peacekeeping and war fighting”.

Ließt man letztlich aber das Vorwort von Le Roy, taucht zwar tatsätzlich die Frage auf, “Have we reached the limits of our capabilities?”, von kritischer Selbstreflexion ist Le Roy aber weit entfernt. Zum Beispiel, wenn er Haiti und Kosovo (Anfang 2009!) als gelungene Beispiele für UN-Interventionen nennt:

But let us not forget that there are, of course, many important examples of successful UN peacekeeping that has helped to improve the lives of hundreds of millions of the world’s most vulnerable people. Recently, in Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Kosovo, circumstances have improved sufficiently to allow the UN to complete or continue drawing down its operations. The situation has also continued to improve in Haiti, Côte d’Ivoire, and Timor-Leste. In Lebanon, peacekeepers have helped to build confidence and continued to help prevent the resumption of hostilities along the Litani River.

Da wundert man sich dann auch nicht mehr, dass sich das CIC nicht schämt, seine Publikation mit einem Zitat von Martti Ahtisaari zu bewerben…

Eher ironisch wirkt dagegen, dass das CIC nur wenige Zeilen darunter eine andere Publikation bewirbt, welche die Bemühungen der UN um State-Building in Haiti eher kritisch bewertet. Zum Abschluss einige sehr selektive Auszüge aus diesem Dokument “U.N. Peace Operations and State-building: A Case Study of Haiti” vom März 2009:

As regards its broader efforts to consolidate peace, the UN System (and donors more broadly) could benefit from more systematic consideration of the distinct but interrelated challenges of enhancing state legitimacy and state capacity. In Haiti, the principal state-building activities concentrated first on state capacity (rather than legitimacy), and second, on specific sectors rather than holistic needs. It is far easier in terms of institutional practice for international actors, and especially the state-based United Nations, to address the latter than the former. But legitimacy is at least as important as capacity in state sustainability…
Some longtime international analysts dismissed linear notions of progress in institutional reform in Haiti. Instead, they argue that reform patterns are more cyclical or circular. They readily point to UN-supported efforts to reform state institutions ranging from the Haitian National Police (HNP) to the justice system to the corrections system to the civil service in the 1990s. Such efforts are widely acknowledged to have failed but are being reprised with the same actors and outlines today…
In Haiti, the UN System and partners
should engage the issues of legitimacy discussed above. Sustainable state legitimacy requires sensitivity to ameliorating, and not deepening, the political and economic inequalities in the country. MINUSTAH is seen as having worked closely with the country’s political and economic elites and has not developed deep or broad relations with Haitian civil society.

Haiti vor der Wahl - ICG legt Briefing vor

Mittwoch, 04. März 2009

Am 19.April soll in Haiti ein Drittel des Senats gewählt werden. Die Sicherheitslage hat sich anscheinend leicht verbessert, die soziale Lage sei hingegen schlechter als vor den letzten Ausschreitungen und birgt deshalb große Gefahren im Kontext der Wahl. Vor diesem Hintergrung legte die International Crisis Group ein neues Briefing zu der Lage in Haiti mit dem Titel Stability at Risk vor: [Zusammenfassung]

Bemerkenswert dabei scheint zunächst, dass die ICG ihre Rhetorik und ihre Perspektive leicht verändert hat. Soziale Probleme und die Rolle der Armen spielen in diesem Briefing eine wesentlich größere Rolle als in früheren Publikationen, allerdings weiterhin fast ausschließlich als begünstigende Faktoren für Aufstände. Die Riots im Frühjahr 2008 werden mittlerweile auf solche Probleme zurückgeführt, die Rolle der Drogenmafia dabei wurde - obwohl diesmal immerhin (schwach) belegt - in die Fußnoten verwiesen.

Das Briefing liefert spannende Ansätze für weitere Recherchen: so muss es eine 2006/2007 eine “U.S. Haiti Stabilization Initiative” gegeben haben und von Seiten der Regierung ein Program for Social Appeasement (PAS). Venezuela hingegen nahm Haiti in das PetroCaribe-Programm auf, dessen Einnahmen für die Beseitigung von Sturmschäden aufgebracht werden sollten. Interessant fand ich auch den Vorgang, aus dem die “Legilsative Agenda” der neuen Regierung hervorging. Hierzu steht in dem Bericht: “This is all the more urgent because of the need to pass the 2008-2009 national budget rapidly and adopt the legislative agenda that was identified in December 2008 at a seminar with international support.” Eine Fußnote ergänzt:

“The agenda results from a 9-10 December 2008 seminar organised with Canadian Parliamentary Centre, MINUSTAH Civil Affairs and USAID-SUNY (State University of New York) parliamentary support project help. It provides the government and parliament an agreed framework within which to work. The agenda, which applies to the first 2009 parliamentary session (January-May), includes items such as the treaty on port safety and bills on the customs code and anti-corruption.”

Einen Schwerpunkt des Berichts bildet die Darstellung von Regierung und Parlament. Obwohl das im Moment die Haitianer auf der Straße alles wenig interessiert, mag das angemessen sein, sind diese doch für die Verteilung der internationalen Hilfsgelder zuständig. Darin scheint sich Politik in Haiti nach den Darstellungen der ICG auch weitestgehend zu erschöpfen. Demnach sei es der neuen Premierministerin Pierre-Louis bislang nicht gelungen, die in sie gesetzten Hoffnungen - nichtmal insofern sie realistisch waren - zu erfüllen. Dann geht es um die in zwei Monaten anstehenden Wahlen, die in neue Gewalt münden können. Hier wird das Provisional Electoral Council (CEP), das mit internationaler Finanzierung die Wahlen vorbereiten soll (”A memorandum of understanding for financing the elections was signed on 23 January 2009 between the government, the CEP, the U.S., Canada, the EU and Brazil)” von der ICG recht offen dafür kritisiert, dass es keine Kandidaten der ehemaligen Bewegung Aristides, der Fanmi Lavalas, zulässt.

Die ökonomische Lage habe sich seit den Riots 2008 weiter verschlechtert. Dafür wird neben den Wirbelstürmen letzten Sommer insbesondere die globale Finanzkrise als Ursache benannt, weil sie die Remissen, die Überweisungen von Haitianern im Ausland, verringere. Diese hätten 2006 bereits über 30% des BIP in Haiti ausgemacht. Auch die Bereitschaft von Drittstaaten, Geld für Projekte in Haiti aufzubringen, sei durch die Finanzkrise zurückgegangen. Die Inflation betrug 2008 13%, während der Wachstum auf 1,5% einknickte.

Beim Thema Sicherheit fällt die ICG allerdings endgültig wieder in alte Wahrnehmungsmuster zurück. Die Position des Polizeichefs (Mario Andrésol, Aristide-Hasser und Liebling Washingtons wie der weißen Oberschicht), dass mehr Geld für die Polizei und eine schnellere Ausbildung dieser nötig seien, wird ebenso widerspruchsfrei übernommen, wie die Annahme von Polizei und UN, dass sich die zeitgleich mit dem Anwachsen der Polizei massiv angestiegene Zahl gemeldeter Verbrechen (”Nonetheless, in the same period authorities registered 509 cases of crime as compared to 389 in January-February 2008; reported crimes rose from 1,079 in 2007 to 2,847 in 2008″) nur mit dem zunehmenden Vertrauen der Bevölkerung in die Polizei erklären ließe. Am Rande wird erwähnt, dass die Polizei nicht zuverlässig und selbst in viele Verbrechen verwickelt ist. Die Zusammenarbeit von Polizei und ausländischem Militär, insbesondere durch die USA wird durchweg begrüßt.

Haiti: Keeping them calm

Mittwoch, 24. September 2008

Die International Crisis Group schießt mal wieder den Vogel ab: Die Proteste vergangenen April, die laut ICG in den gestiegenen Lebensmittelpreisen ihren Ursprung genommen haben sowie die Zerstörung der Infrastruktur durch die Tropenstürme der letzten Wochen nimmt die Crisis Group nun zum Anlass, erneut einen verstärkten Aufbau des Sicherheitssektors zu fordern. Konkret wird empfohlen, die MINUSTAH im Land zu belassen, den Polizeiaufbau zu beschleunigen, robustere Polizeieinheiten zu schaffen und die Polizei u.a. intensiver in Riot-Control auszubilden, sowie die porösen Grenzen besser zu sichern.

Die Bevölkerung wird tendenziell als kriminell dargestellt, jedenfalls aber als politisch unmündig. Die Crisis Group warnt davor, dass “Spoiler” die Unzufriedenheit der Bevölkerung ausnutzen könnten, um die Regierung zu destabilisieren. So sei es auch bei den Protesten im April gewesen, bei denen nach Angaben der ICG Drogenhändler die Ausschreitungen angeheizt hätten. Als Quellen für diese Darstellung nennt die ICG anonyme Interviewpartner. Außer Drogenhändler, Teilen der Wirtschaftselite und “korrupten Politikern” werden auch die Anhänger von Aristide als “Spoiler” bezeichnet.

Die Ereignisse im April werden insgesamt so dargestellt, dass es kleine Proteste wegen der Preise gegeben hätte, die dann von politisch interessierter Seite eskaliert worden wären. UN-Soldaten und HNP hätten nicht rechtzeitig eingegriffen um dieses Eskalieren zu verhindern. Deshalb hätten sie später eben auch tödliche Schüsse abgeben müssen und sollten nun in “non-lethal crowd control” ausgebildet werden. Dennoch wird das Engagement der MINUSTAH insgesamt gelobt, die Sicherheitssituation in einigen der gefährlichsten Slums, in denen die UN-Truppen intensive Operationen durchgeführt haben, habe sich deutlich verbessert. Die Bewohner von Cité Soleil und Gonaïves hätten sich kaum an den Protesten beteiligt:

“Strikingly, there were few incidents in the Cité Soleil district of the capital and in Gonaïves, both infamous for violent social outbursts. Substantial international intervention over the past several years in Cité Soleil and internationally-funded community projects in the hilltops surrounding Gonaïves were central in keeping them calm, as the inhabitants were reluctant to put recently gained improvements and future programs at risk. Despite the presence of agitators in Gonaïves, there were few incidents, as the HNP effectively deployed its scarce resources, with MINUSTAH help, to prevent the spread of violence.”

Es gibt zahlreiche Passagen, in denen deutlich wird, dass das internationale Militär zur sozialen Kontrolle eingesetzt wird.

“While MINUSTAH sources believe the Brazilian battalion in Cité Soleil is doing a good job of engaging the community in humanitarian work and establishing efficient intelligence networks in the neighbourhoods it patrols, there are worrying signs smaller, community-based gangs mainly composed of former gang members and youths are re-emerging in the slums…
A part of the principal MINUSTAH military base in Cité Soleil has been converted into a temporary police station, where a too-small force of 31 works in three shifts, while three permanent U.S.-funded stations await completion.”

An einer Stelle geht der Bericht darauf ein, dass die Armut und Perspektivlosigkeit eine Ursache für die Kriminalität darstellt. Die ICG berichtet, dass vermutet wird, dass zahlreiche Personen an Entführungen beteiligt sind, die zuvor aus den USA abgeschoben wurden. Etwa 25 Personen werden wöchentlich unter Zwang in das “Armenhaus Amerikas” verbracht, viele von ihnen beherrschten nicht die kreolische Sprache und hätten in Haiti keine Verwandten. Die International Organization for Migration versorgt die Abgeschobenen nur je eine Woche mit Nahrung und Unterkunft, danach seien sie auf sich alleine gestellt, was dazu führt, dass sie sich oft kriminellen Netzwerken anschließen.

Was tatsächlich bemerkenswert ist an dem Bericht, ist die Tatsache, dass er an keiner Stelle auch nur oberflächliche Vorschläge oder Empfehlungen macht, wie Armut und Hunger unter der Bevölkerung reduziert werden könnte. Die Crisis Group interessiert sich alleine für die Sicherheitslage und wie sie mit repressiven Instrumenten in den Griff zu bekommen wäre. Das größte Problem scheint zu sein, dass die Tropenstürme der vergangen Wochen nicht nur Ernten und zivile Infrastruktur vernichtet hätten, sondern auch Polizeistationen, Gerichte und Gefängnisse beschädigten:

“The devastation left by the procession of tropical storms and hurricanes – Fay, Gustav, Hanna and Ike – in August and September 2008 has compounded an already difficult situation for the new government and further demonstrated the fragility of Haiti’s physical and social infrastructure. The rains and flooding have drowned crops and livestock, weakening agriculture in a year when food shortages play centre stage in politics. Police stations, courts and jails, especially in Gonaïves, were also damaged.”

Haiti im Sturm aber mit neuer Regierung

Montag, 08. September 2008

Bereits im Juni wurde als neue Premierministerin in Haiti Michele Duvivier Pierre-Louis vorgeschlagen. Von der internationalen Presse gefeiert wurde aber auch sie, wie die beiden Kandidaten, die zuvor vorgeschlagen wurden, zunächst vom Senat abgelehnt.

Seit dem war das Land v.a. mit Hurricans beschäftigt. Vier Stück fegten im letzten Monat über Haiti hinweg und forderten um die 600 Menschenleben, schätzungsweise 650.000 weitere Menschen sind betroffen. Hilfsorganisationen sprechen von einer humanitären Katastrophe und können viele Betroffene wegen zerstörter Brücken und Strassen nicht erreichen. Die Minustah hat nach eigenen Angaben “mehrere tausend Bewohner” aus Gonaives evakuiert.

Nach Angaben der MSF wurden 25-30.000 Wohnungen zerstört. Die Ärzte-Organisation hat in Gonaives eine Krankenstation wiederhergestellt, nachdem alle anderen medizinischen Einrichtungen der Stadt ihre funktion eingebüßt haben.

Mehr zur medizinischen Versorgung in Haiti liefert übrigens dieser sehr anschauliche Bericht von Rupa Chinai: Haiti’s Food and Health Crises

Wegen der Stürme wurde die Abstimmung über die neue Präsidentin mehrfach verschoben.

Am Montag, dem 25.8.2008 haben nach Berichten des Vatikan erneut hunderte Menschen gegen steigende Preise für Nahrungsmittel protestiert. Wie die Nachrichtenagentur misna meldete, trieben UN-Blauhelm-Soldaten die Menschen durch den Einsatz von Tränengas auseinander.

Einige Medien meinen, dies hätte auch Druck auf den Präsidenten ausgeübt, endlich ein neues Kabinet vorzuschlagen, was er noch am Abend desselben Tages tat. Die Liste der MinisterInnen wurde u.a. hier veröffentlicht.

Am 5. September wurde die neue Premierministerin dann nach einer Marathonsitzung, die live im Fernsehen und Radio übertragen wurde, mit einer Stimme Mehrheit gewählt.

http://www.dradio.de/dlf/sendungen/einewelt/829286/

Peacekeeping Plus: Das unmögliche Mandat

Montag, 08. September 2008

Von 4.-6. September trafen sich Vertreter der “Internationalen Gemeinschaft”, humanitärer Organisationen, westlicher Armeen und der NATO mit Menschenrechtskriegern, um den Zusammenhang zwischen Menschenrechten und “Friedensmissionen” zu diskutieren. Das Programm findet sich hier.

Dort sprach auch Gareth Evans, President der International Crisis Group, darüber, wie Mandate für robustere Friedensmissionen und “Feuerwehreinsätze” entsprechend der R2P zu gestalten seien. In seiner Rede stellte er fest, dass es noch keine passenden Mandate, vor allem aber keine passenden Ausbildungsprogramme, Doktrinen und “Rules of Engagements” gäbe, die den Schutz von Zivilpersonen effektiv in militärisches Handeln umsetzen. Was die Mandate und Doktrinen angeht, macht er einige Vorschläge.

Ich denke seine Ausführungen lassen sich gegenwärtig sehr gut am Beispiel Tschad belegen. Sie fassen im Wesentlichen eine sehr ausführliche Studie von Victoria K. Holt und Tobias C. Berkman mit dem Titel “The Impossible Mandate – Military Preparedness, the R2P and Modern Peace Operations” aus dem Jahre 2006 zusammen. Diese Studie ist bemerkenswert und wurde v.a. vom Human Security Program des kanadischen Außenministeriums finanziert und versucht eine Bestandsaufnahme aller entsprechenden Doktrinen und Trainingsprogramme westlicher Staaten, die tendenziell auf den Umgang mit ZivilistInnen abzielen. Außerdem stellt sie einige “Friedensmissionen” und ihre Probleme ganz gut dar, allerdings stets unter der Prämisse, dass ein robusteres mandat und robusteres Eingreifen die Situation verbessern würde. Das wird bzgl. der MINUSTAH-Mission noch relativiert. die MONUC hingegen wird als Lehrobjekt und auch als Vorbild sehr ausführlich behandelt. Hier finden sich auch eklatante Fehleinschätzunge und Verzerrungen. Ansonsten ist der Text überhaupt nicht naiv, sondern sehr ambitioniert. Er will tatsächlich Vorbedingungen schaffen für mehr, robustere und erfolgreichere UN- und R2P-Missionen auch ohne UN-Mandat.